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Theorizing the Law / Politics Distinction:
Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action,
and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin
Robert C. Post†
Neil S. Siegel††
Paul Mishkin was a colleague and a teacher to us, and we each esteem
him as a master craftsman of the law: learned, wise, and farsighted. To reread
his publications is to enter a world of clarity and integrity, in which no word is
wasted and insight is deep.
Early in his career Mishkin saw that the law could be apprehended from
two distinct and in part incompatible perspectives: from the internal perspective
of a faithful practitioner and from the external perspective of the general public.
If the social legitimacy of the law as a public institution resides in the latter, the
legal legitimacy of the law as a principled unfolding of professional reason
inheres in the former.1 Mishkin came to believe that although the law required
Copyright © 2007 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
† David Boies Professor of Law, Yale Law School. One of the irreparable losses of my
recent move to Yale has been the loss of the everyday companionship of Paul Mishkin.
†† Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke Law School. I am indebted to
Paul Mishkin for his profound teaching. When I would leave the Court to catch the last train
home, I would often look at the awesome building against the night sky and reflect on my
experiences that day, whether inspiring or disillusioning. During those times, I would think of
Paul.
We are jointly grateful for the incisive comments of Bruce Ackerman, Jesse Choper,
Richard Fallon, Philip Frickey, Barry Friedman, Martin Golding, John Jeffries, Robert Mosteller,
H. Jefferson Powell, Jedediah Purdy, Christopher Schroeder, Reva Siegel, and the participants in
this symposium.
1. See, for example, the distinction between “legal” and “sociological” legitimacy in
Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1790-91 (2005)
(“When legitimacy functions as a legal concept, legitimacy and illegitimacy are gauged by legal
norms. As measured by sociological criteria, the Constitution or a claim of legal authority is
legitimate insofar as it is accepted (as a matter of fact) as deserving of respect or obedience—or,
in a weaker usage . . . , insofar as it is otherwise acquiesced in.”). See also Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1383, 1387 (2001) (“[T]he work of constitutional judges must have both ‘legal’ and ‘social’
legitimacy. Social legitimacy, as distinguished from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential
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both forms of legitimacy, there was nevertheless serious tension between them,
and he dedicated his scholarly career to attempting to theorize this persistent
but necessary tension, which he conceived almost as a form of antinomy.
In this article we pay tribute to Mishkin’s quest for understanding. We
argue that the tension identified by Mishkin is significant and unavoidable, but
that it is also exaggerated. It presupposes an unduly stringent separation
between professional reason and popular values. In our view the law/politics
distinction is both real and suffused with ambiguity and uncertainty. The
existence of the law/politics distinction creates the possibility of the rule of law,
but the ragged and blurred boundaries of that distinction vivify the law by
infusing it with the commitments and ideals of those whom the law purports to
govern.
I
The Legitimation of Law: Elisions in Legal Process Jurisprudence
Mishkin (b. 1927) came of age in the era of what we would now call legal
process jurisprudence, which was dominated by giants like Henry M. Hart, Jr.
(1905-1969) and Herbert Wechsler (1909-2000). As a young professor,
Mishkin taught from, and was influenced by, the manuscript which would
eventually become Hart and Wechsler’s “masterful”2 The Federal Courts and
the Federal System. In time Mishkin would become a coauthor of the second
and third editions of the book.
For Hart and Wechsler, “reason” was “the life of the law.”3 They insisted
that the Supreme Court should “be a voice of reason, charged with the creative
function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and
durable principles of constitutional law.”4 “[T]he main constituent of the
judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”5 They
regarded reason and principle as distinguishing legal decision from mere
“willfulness or will,”6 as separating a court from a mere “naked power organ.” 7

antecedents of constitutional decisions and asks whether those decisions are widely understood to
be the correct ones given the social and economic milieu in which they are rendered.” (footnote
omitted)).
2. Paul J. Mishkin, Book Review, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 776, 776 (1954) (reviewing
HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (1953)).
3. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 125 (1959).
4. Id. at 99.
5. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1959).
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 12.
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Hart and Wechsler did not insist on reason and principle because they
would render courts more accountable, or because they were necessary to
ensure fairness to litigants. They believed instead that reason and principle
would endow law with legitimacy. If courts engaged in merely “ad hoc
evaluation,” 8 deciding each case simply on the basis of its desired outcome
without reference to “reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved,”9 there would be no reason for
persons to submit to judicial authority whenever they lost a lawsuit. Courts
claim authority not because their decisions are agreeable—every case has a
losing party as well as a winning one—but because their decisions are “asserted
to have . . . legal quality,” which inheres in the obligation “to be . . . entirely
principled.” 10 It is thus not sufficient in criticizing a court’s decision to
complain that it has reached a wrong outcome; one must also assign “reasons
that should have prevailed with the tribunal.”11 In the view of Hart and
Wechsler, “[o]nly opinions which are grounded in reason,” which possess “the
underpinning of principle,” can “carry the weight which has to be carried by the
opinions of a tribunal which, after all, does not in the end have the power either
in theory or in practice to ram its own personal preferences down other
people’s throats.”12
In truth, Hart and Wechsler were not particularly clear about what they
meant by “reason” or “principle.” They knew full well that reason and principle
were “inescapably ‘political’ . . . in that they involve a choice among
competing values or desires.”13 And they were also aware that neither reason
nor principle could transform law into a set of “rules” whose meaning could be
fully and determinately specified in advance. Hart had in fact written that much
law must necessarily come in the form of “standards” whose meaning could be
known only at “the point of application” in the context of a “particular
situation.”14 For Hart and Wechsler, therefore, “reason” and “principle”
8. Id.
9. Id. at 19.
10. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 19.
11. Id. at 11. Thus Henry Hart complained that
[m]any even of the professional critics of the Court’s work seem to have little more
to say, in substance, than that they do not like some of the results and yearn for ipse
dixits their way instead of the Court’s way. Meanwhile, the principal vocal
accompaniment of the Court’s labors is provided by the shrill voices of even more
shallow-minded lay commentators, crying, “One up (or one down) for subversion,”
“One up (or one down) for civil liberties,” “One up (or one down) for states’ rights.”
But the time must come when it is understood again, inside the profession as well as
outside, that reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your side. When that
time comes, and the country gathers its resources for the realization of this life
principle, the principle will be more completely realized than it now seems to be.
Hart, supra note 3, at 125.
12. Id. at 99.
13. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 15.
14. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 140 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
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entailed neither value neutrality nor outcome determinativeness.
What, then, did their emphasis on “reason” and “principle” signify? It
seemed to suggest a fundamental commitment to a “type of reasoned
explanation that . . . is intrinsic to judicial action.”15 It meant a commitment to
act only in virtue of articulated reasons and to be bound by such articulated
reasons wherever applicable. But this thin commitment left unanswered many
hard questions. For example, what values should articulated reasons embody?
How abstractly or concretely should principles be formulated? How is the
appropriate scope of a principle’s application to be ascertained? The answers to
these questions were fundamental, yet in essence Hart and Wechsler simply
remitted them to the actual practice of the ongoing norms of the legal
profession. In effect, therefore, the affirmation of “principle” and “reason” in
legal process jurisprudence signified the importance of fidelity to the
professional practices that comprised “good lawyership.”16
There is a strange elision at the core of this account of law. It is
implausible to imagine that the authority of courts can be sustained in the
context of serious controversies merely because judges offer reasons or
principles for their decisions, even when they do so in ways that comply with
the best professional norms of practice. To understand how Hart and Wechsler
might have advanced such a position, we might conceive them as making two
distinct points. First, professional norms, including norms of reason-giving, are
essential to law; second, law, qua law, carries authority and legitimacy.
The first point invokes the plausible idea that requiring judges to articulate
the principles that drive their decisions would contribute toward the fulfillment
of a major function of law, which is to provide “a justification in principle for
official coercion.”17 Treating reasons as authoritative would discipline courts to
decide future cases according to articulated reasons, and it would also provide
reliable guidance to the public about the future path of the law. “Only opinions
which are grounded in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent can do the job
which the Supreme Court of the United States has to do. Only opinions of this
kind can be worked with by other men who have to take a judgment rendered
on one set of facts and decide how it should be applied to a cognate but still
different set of facts.”18 Hart and Wechsler’s celebration of reason and
principle, understood in the context of an affirmation of professional norms of
practice, would thus seem intimately connected to achieving the goods of
consistency, stability, predictability, and transparency that are essential to the
rule of law.19
1994). Hart and Sachs discuss the distinction between rules and standards at 139-41.
15. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 15-16.
16. Hart, supra note 3, at 100.
17. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 110 (1986).
18. Hart, supra note 3, at 99.
19. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial
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Hart and Wechsler’s second point seems largely unexamined. All would
no doubt agree that the rule of law is of enormous social value. But there are
other important social ideals, and these ideals can sometimes conflict with the
value of legality.20 Such conflicts are in fact endemic to moments of high
controversy. When rule-of-law values conflict with other important social
goods, it may be inaccurate to assume that judicial decision making gains
authority merely by remaining faithful to rule-of-law virtues. Adherence to
Lochner precedents of substantive due process may well have been consistent
with the rule of law, and in sustaining Lochner-type norms of substantive due
process the Court may have been keeping faith with established norms of
professional practice, including norms of reason-giving. But such fidelity in no
way contributed to the authority of the Court during the crisis of the New Deal,
and in fact it likely undermined the legitimacy of the Court.21
Neither Hart nor Wechsler, however, theorized situations of this kind.
They emphasized instead “the professional respect of first-rate lawyers for the
incumbent Justices of the Court,”22 implying that the craft of “good
lawyership”23 was freestanding and self-validating. Professional reason
appeared in their work as an unquestioned source of authority and legitimacy.
II
The Gap Between Professional Reason and Popular Legitimation
Mishkin deeply internalized the focus of legal process jurisprudence on
“analytical considerations.”24 He prized the integrity of professional craft and
Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951, 2015-16 (2005); Robert C. Post,
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in Constitutional Domains: Democracy,
Community, Management 30-32 (1995).
20. Post, supra note 19, at 40-41; Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in The
Authority of Law 228 (1979) (“Since the rule of law is just one of the virtues the law should
possess, it is to be expected that it possesses no more than prima facie force. It has always to be
balanced against competing claims of other values.”); id. at 229 (noting that “the rule of law is
meant to enable the law to promote social good” and cautioning that “[s]acrificing too many social
goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and empty”); Martin Krygier,
Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections after the Collapse of Communism, 15 L. & Soc.
Inquiry 633, 645 (1990) (“There is also room for argument that the rule of law is not all we
should want and for recognition that, in case of conflict of values, we need not assume that only
maintenance of the rule of law matters, or that any chink in what are fancied to be its formalistic
preconditions spells its doom.” (footnote omitted)).
21. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1387 (“The proper lesson of Lochner instructs us that,
even where it is possible to identify a jurisprudential basis for judicial decisions, if those familiar
with the Court’s decisions do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of judges
will be seen as illegitimate. There will be attacks on judges and, ultimately, on the institution of
judicial review. Even in the face of established precedent, law itself will come to be seen as
nothing but politics.”).
22. Hart, supra note 3, at 101.
23. Id. at 100.
24. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 833 (1957).
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rigor. He dedicated his first book to the proposition that although “Legal
Realism’s major battle has been won,”25 it must also be affirmed “that judicial
action functions within limits of both power and propriety—limits that are
rarely narrow or rigid, but important limits nonetheless. These bounds are
found in the judicial institution and its processes, in the conception of the
judge’s task and how it is properly done.”26 In an early article he insisted that
“professional commentators on the Court’s work should begin to focus more on
the objective resolution and analysis of the issues before the court and less on
the personalities or politics.” Mishkin hoped that this change of focus would
break the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of a crude legal realism “that decisions of
Supreme Court Justices are always wholly matters of personal politics and
predilection.”27 Three decades later, he was still affirming that “[i]n theory, at
least, the Court—as distinguished from other agencies of government—must
rest its decision on an analytically sound principle.”28
But Mishkin also perceived the elision at the heart of legal process
jurisprudence. While he wholeheartedly affirmed the importance of rule-of-law
virtues, he recognized that professional reason was not unambiguously self25. Paul J. Mishkin & Clarence Morris, On Law in Courts: An Introduction to
Judicial Development of Case and Statute Law, at v (1965) (“Nowadays only the most
professional naïve believe that courts mechanically apply prefixed law to simon-pure facts.”).
26. Id. Mishkin believed that “unfortunately,”
the lesson taught by the realists is sometimes over-learned. The recognition of
judges’ humanness and the rejection of mechanical theories of the judicial process is
then seen as implying that judicial choices range entirely free and that courts are
seldom, if ever, hampered in doing just precisely as they wish. Moreover, this view is
often coupled with the implicit assumption that this is as things must be—that there
can be no effective limits on the power of judges. . . .
We think these latter inferences wrong.
Id. See id. at 39 (“Understanding, training and tradition combine to enforce judicial allegiance to
the principles, doctrines and precedents which constitute the official inheritance. As Professor
Llewellyn has put it, judges feel a duty to both justice and the law.”); Id. at 40 (“Judges are, on the
whole, decent and honorable men who seek to live up to their conceptions of the proper role of the
judge. . . . Moreover, their ideas of what the proper role of a judge is—of what the obligations of
the position are—are substantially shaped by their own professional training and experience, and
by the expectations and conceptions of the legal profession.”); Id. at 191 (“The ordinary judicial
decision is closely related to an existing body of doctrines and precedents bearing on the issue
before the court. The court has an obligation to line up these ordinary decisions with those
authorities. This is the obligation of consistency. Some significant options are open to courts
deciding routine cases, but the range within which there is this freedom of choice is usually . . .
limited . . . .”).
27. Paul J. Mishkin, Prophecy, Realism and the Supreme Court: The Development of
Institutional Unity, 40 A.B.A.J. 680, 682-83 (August 1954).
28. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 930 (1983). By “principle,”
Mishkin meant opinion writing that meets basic “demands of generality and fidelity—requiring
sincere efforts to reason in terms of precepts that transcend the individual case and that are
conscientiously seen as governing in all cases within their stated terms.” Id. at 909. Principle
“transcends the particular case, is rationally defensible in those general terms, and is analytically
adequate to support the result.” Id. at 929. Mishkin distinguished his conception of principle from
Wechsler’s “neutral principles” thesis. See id. at 908-909 (citing Wechsler, supra note 5).
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validating. It is striking that Mishkin and his almost exact contemporary
Alexander Bickel (1924-1974) were each drawn to study “the intersection of
principle and politics,” to theorize those situations where “the demands of a
wise or politic result may be in tension with the dictates of principle.”29
Although each believed in the value of professional craft, each also sought to
understand circumstances in which, paradoxically, the single-minded pursuit of
professional craft could undermine the authority of the Court.30
In his profound analysis of United States v. Nixon,31 for example, Mishkin
flayed the Court on the ground that “its major pronouncements are essentially
ex cathedra, its analysis of the major issues simplistic, and its doctrines
supported far more by the fiat of the Justices’ commissions than by the weight
of either learning or reasoning.”32 In the context both of President Nixon’s
assertion that no Executive Branch official could invoke compulsory judicial
process against him and of the ultimate issue of executive privilege, Mishkin
traced a repeated pattern in the Court’s opinion “of a gratuitous nonconsequence-bearing declaration favoring a position taken by the President,
followed by a somewhat off-the-mark rationale supporting a holding squarely
against him.”33 So, for example, the Court unnecessarily asserted that “the
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case,”34 even though the special prosecutor in the case
“was undoubtedly in the Executive Branch,”35 and “[t]he issue had been—and
remains—a very live and important one in the context of whether Congress can
establish an independent special prosecutor appointed and removable by
judges.” 36 The Court nevertheless flatly rejected the President’s contention that
no Executive Branch official could invoke judicial process against him,
ignoring “the line of authority [and] history (represented, e.g., by Myers v.
29. Id. at 907.
30. Alexander Bickel put the point this way:
But Mr. Wechsler, I believe, is not right.
No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one, can fail in time to explode
if it is deprived of the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways of muddling through.
No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.
But it is not true in our society that we are generally governed wholly by principle in
some matters and indulge a rule of expediency exclusively in others. There is no
such neat dividing line. . . . Most often, . . . and as often as not in matters of the
widest and deepest concern, such as the racial problem, both requirements exist most
imperatively side by side: guiding principle and expedient compromise. The role of
principle, when it cannot be the immutable governing rule, is to affect the tendency
of policies of expediency. And it is a potent role.
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 64 (1962).
31. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
32. Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22
UCLA L. Rev. 76, 76 (1974).
33. Id. at 83.
34. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693.
35. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 81.
36. Id.
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United States) which asserts with great strength the inherent power of the
President to control and to remove subordinate policy-level officials in the
Executive Branch despite even congressional legislation seeking to limit it.”37
The peculiar pattern in the Court’s opinion, Mishkin explained, was due to
the fact that the case involved “the great public issue” of “whether the President
was above or under the law,”38 and that the Court, in confronting the President,
had primarily “to take into account the Court’s own institutional position” in
order to conserve its “stature, prestige, and future effectiveness.” 39 Mishkin
argued that the analytical failures of the Nixon opinion were caused by the
Court’s desire to avert the twin dangers that the President “might defy the
Court’s order” and that “the Court might become the focus of animus or
partisan attack by the President’s supporters.”40 Mishkin recognized that
fidelity to principle was in tension with the competing value of the Court’s own
institutional legitimacy, and he was prepared to conclude:
If the price of preservation of the Court’s effectiveness and prestige is
the handing down of such unsatisfactory opinions, then even an
institution whose authority is premised upon adherence to principle

37. Id. at 82-83 (footnote omitted) (referencing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926)). Mishkin saw the same pattern “in the Court’s handling of the ultimate issue of executive
privilege.” Id. at 83. In “firmly pronounc[ing] not only the existence of a presidential executive
privilege based on a general need for confidentiality, but explicitly that it rests on a constitutional
base,” the Court used only “generalized a priori reasoning” and ignored “[t]he substantial body of
scholarly learning on the subject, which includes careful historical and analytical treatments.” Id.
at 83-84. The Court’s declaration that the privilege was of constitutional (as opposed to common
law) moment “carried no real consequences in the case,” for the Court then held that the privilege
“must nevertheless yield to the need for complete evidence in criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 84.
The Court was unconcerned with “the nature of the criminal prosecution,” even though the special
prosecutor “had strongly urged” the narrower limitation “that the privilege would be overcome
only on a showing that there was substantial basis for belief that the participants in the
conversation were probably involved in criminal activities.” Mishkin, supra note 32, at 84.
Although “one expects the Supreme Court to resolve a difficult issue, and particularly one with
constitutional dimensions, on the narrowest available grounds,” the Nixon Court “certainly” did
not choose that “route.” Id. at 85.
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id.
40. Id. To meet the first danger, the Court had to “close ranks” around a “single opinion,”
which empowered any Justice to “demand, as the price of his not writing separately, the inclusion
(or exclusion) . . . of any language or ideas to which he assigns sufficient importance.” Id. at 87.
The second danger “could not be totally avoided,” but “it would certainly be exacerbated by any
language or position which made reference to the possible personal involvement of the President;
it might be minimized by scrupulous maintenance of an apparently totally neutral stance—not
only with regard to the facts but in the selection of abstract and highly generalized principles as
the rationale of any adverse holding.” Mishkin, supra note 32, at 88. Mishkin accounted for “the
gratuitous, overbroad statements in favor of presidential positions” in terms of “[t]he negotiated
nature of the unanimous opinion” and “[t]he drive to present a totally neutral appearance.” Id. at
88. “But the principal impact of the need for a starkly neutral stance appears in the selection of the
rationales asserted in support of the holdings against Mr. Nixon.” Id. By operating at a high level
of abstraction and focusing “on the simple pendency of a criminal prosecution,” the Court avoided
“the slightest reference or allusion to possible implication of the President himself.” Id. at 89.
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and to reason may be forgiven in seeing such defective opinion-writing
as a reasonable cost to pay. The misleading nature of what is written
can be corrected by the Court later, and with relative ease. Damage to
the Court’s stature, prestige, or credibility is not so easily repaired.41
In Mishkin’s view, a pure exercise of professional reason would have
been insufficient to endow the Court’s opinion with authority in United States
v. Nixon. Hart and Wechsler neither conceived nor theorized the possibility of
this tension between principle and legitimacy. At the root of the tension is the
fact that rule-of-law virtues can unambiguously establish authority only within
a community that is primarily dedicated to the rule of the law, which is to say
within a community of legal professionals. But the legitimacy of courts does
not depend merely upon this community, but instead most directly upon the
polity in its widest political sense. Mishkin understood the importance of
maintaining “that public confidence which is the ultimate foundation of the
Court’s authority.”42 Throughout his career Mishkin would remain exquisitely
attuned to public perceptions of the Court. It was characteristic for him to
identify the contradiction within the Nixon decision as flowing from the fact
that it was “addressed almost entirely to the present and to the current
American public,” but that it failed to “speak with anything like the same
strength to the law and the future.” 43
Over and over again, Mishkin would demonstrate the difficulties accruing
to constitutional adjudication because of the fundamental disparity between
professional and popular beliefs. This disparity was not easily mediated.
Although Mishkin approved “the wisdom and propriety of the Court’s” opting
to preserve its institutional legitimacy over its fidelity to rule-of-law virtues, he
nevertheless acknowledged that the choice posed “a most difficult and
fundamental problem.”44 He was “sufficiently conscious of the dangers of
simply concluding that short term success is its own proof of right to know that
I hold this position only with tentativeness and subject to reexamination with
greater perspective.”45 What he regarded as a fierce, indissoluble tension
between the demands of professional craft and the requirements of public
legitimacy led him to a brooding uncertainty.

41. Id. at 90. Mishkin did not explain why he considered it of paramount importance to
preserve the “effectiveness and prestige” of the Court.
42. Mishkin, supra note 27, at 683.
43. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 76. It should be noted in this regard that Karl Llewellyn
was a major influence on Mishkin during his law student days at Columbia. See, e.g., supra note
26 (noting Mishkin’s invocation of Llewellyn).
44. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 91.
45. Id.
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III
Confronting the Gap: Habeas Corpus and an Early Success
Mishkin recognized the structure of the problem early in his career, when
he identified the weakness in the easy confidence with which Hart and
Wechsler assumed that professional reason could be self-legitimating. This was
the theme of his remarkable 1965 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review,46 in
which he discussed the Court’s assertion in Linkletter v. Walker47 that it
possessed a “general power . . . to decide ‘in each case’ whether a rule should
be given retroactive effect.”48
Mishkin attacked Linkletter for breaking sharply with the “declaratory
theory” of the common law associated with Blackstone, which holds that
“courts simply ‘find’ or declare a preexisting law and do not exercise any
creative function.”49 “Prospective lawmaking,” Mishkin argued, is associated
with the creation of new law and hence “is generally equated with
legislation.” 50 To claim the power to engage in “[p]rospective limitation of
judicial decisions”51 is to endanger “the strongly held and deeply felt belief that
judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law
impersonally as well as impartially, that they exercise no individual choice and
have no program of their own to advance.”52 The stakes were high because the
46. Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 (1965).
47. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
48. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 58 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 59.
50. Id. at 65.
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 62. Justice Scalia has in recent years attacked prospective lawmaking in quite
similar terms—indeed even by citing Mishkin’s Foreword:
That original and enduring American perception of the judicial role sprang not from
the philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Blackstone, which viewed
retroactivity as an inherent characteristic of the judicial power, a power “not
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.” 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (1765). Even when a “former determination is
most evidently contrary to reason ... [or] contrary to the divine law,” a judge
overruling that decision would “not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the
old one from misrepresentation.” Id. at 69-70. “For if it be found that the former
decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was
bad law, but that it was not law.” Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). Fully retroactive
decisionmaking was considered a principal distinction between the judicial and the
legislative power: “[I]t is said that that which distinguishes a judicial from a
legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation
to some existing thing already done or happened, while the other is a
predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases.” T.
Cooley Constitutional Limitations *91. . . .
Prospective decisionmaking was known to foe and friend alike as a practical
tool of judicial activism, born out of disregard for stare decisis. In the eyes of its
enemies, the doctrine “smack[ed] of the legislative process,” Mishkin, 79 Harv. L.
Rev., at 65 . . . .
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107-108 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also id.
at 103 (citing, inter alia, Mishkin, supra note 46, at 58-72, in noting that “commentary, of course,
has . . . regarded the issue of retroactivity as a general problem of jurisprudence”).
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“declaratory theory” at the root of “the Blackstonian concept of court law”
expressed “a symbolic concept of the judicial process on which much of the
courts’ prestige and power depend.” 53 This “symbolic view of courts” is “a
major factor in securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions,”54
bolstering “faith in, and commitment to, a regime of ‘law and order.’”55 “[T]he
establishment and application of a power of prospective limitation produces
sharp and recurrent conflict with the symbolic ideal reflected in the
Blackstonian concept and with the emotional loyalties it commands.”56
Mishkin did not believe, however, that the Blackstonian concept of law
was entirely true. He was of course aware that “[t]he insights of ‘legal
realism,’” which were “increasingly pervasive,” were inconsistent with that
concept of law. Although he sometimes objected to the “oversimplification” of
some applications of legal realism, he conceded that “the approach has a core
of soundness”57 (while nevertheless lamenting the “corrosive effect” of legal
realism upon the Blackstonian concept of courts).58 And of course Mishkin also
knew full well that all law, including judge-made law, “must in fact change,”59
53. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 62.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 64.
56. Id. at 66. See id. at 69 (“[T]he assertion of a general power of prospective limitation
. . . . will tend to generate more frequent arguments for the exercise of such power and the
necessity to respond thereto, with concomitant spotlighting of the fact of change and strong
overtones of legislative rather than judicial process.”). See also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment):
[P]rospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say
what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be. The very framing of the issue that
we purport to decide today—whether our decision in Scheiner shall “apply”
retroactively—presupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed
to declaring what the law already is. Such a view is contrary to that understanding of
“the judicial Power,” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, which is not only the common and
traditional one, but which is the only one that can justify courts in denying force and
effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures, see Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)—the very exercise of judicial power asserted in
Scheiner. To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that
we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it; and when, as in this case, the
constitutionality of a state statute is placed in issue, the question is not whether some
decision of ours “applies” in the way that a law applies; the question is whether the
Constitution, as interpreted in that decision, invalidates the statute. Since the
Constitution does not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our
decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our
interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form
does not make sense.
Id. at 201.
57. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 68.
58. Id. at 68.
59. Id. at 66. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment):
“[T]he judicial Power of the United States” conferred upon this Court and such
inferior courts as Congress may establish, Art. III, § 1, must be deemed to be the
judicial power as understood by our common-law tradition. That is the power “to say
what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), not the
power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
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and that it would be stultifying and undesirable if judges merely applied preexisting law. The image of transparent and passive courts that were mere
mouthpieces of preexisting law was in significant respects sheer fantasy.60
Mishkin thus understood law to straddle an essential contradiction
between the truth of its own application and the preconditions of its public
legitimation. Boldly seizing this contradiction, Mishkin insisted that if the
Blackstonian concept was “in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and
which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost.”61 The Blacksonian concept,
after all, sustained the legitimacy of the legal system itself. Were that concept
to be weakened, so also would the effectiveness and prestige of courts. But this
meant that the legitimacy of adjudication, and of the craft that made
adjudication possible, depended upon myths circulating in a realm of popular
“symbols” that “constitute an important element in any societal structure.”62
For Mishkin, therefore, “symbolism provides substantial emotional
support for basic truths important to proper functioning of the legal system.” 63
Myth and symbolism are necessary for the maintenance of the “rule of law”
itself.64 So long as the “ultimate foundation of the Court’s power” lay in its
“public support,”65 that support would not come from fidelity to professional
reason, but rather from a cultural world of symbols and myths that aroused
emotions of loyalty and allegiance. Mishkin believed that “the general habits of
reliance on the law and obedience to judicial decision” depended “only in small
part” on “ratiocination”:
Much more strongly operative are the symbolic values attached to
courts and the law. Herein lies the emotional strength which is the real
foundation of the “habit” of obedience—in the symbol of the law as a
unaware that judges in a real sense “make” law. But they make it as judges make it,
which is to say as though they were “finding” it—discerning what the law is, rather
than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. Of course
this mode of action poses “difficulties of a ... practical sort,” ante, at 536, when
courts decide to overrule prior precedent. But those difficulties are one of the
understood checks upon judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts
substantially more free to “make new law,” and thus to alter in a fundamental way
the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches.
Id. at 549. We thank Phil Frickey for the references to Justice Scalia’s opinions here and supra in
notes 52 and 56.
60. See also, e.g., Bickel, supra note 30, at 74 (“Judges and lawyers recurrently come to
feel that they find law rather than make it. Many otherwise painful problems seem to solve
themselves with ease when this feeling envelops people.”).
61. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 63. “[C]onsider, for example, the loss involved if judges
could not appeal to the idea that it is ‘the law’ or ‘the Constitution’—and not they personally—
who command a given result.” Id.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Mishkin regarded “the Blackstonian concept” as “an important source of the moral
force that gives substance not only to the felt obligation to obey, but to other pervasive attitudes
toward the Court that are essential to the Court’s effective operation.” Id. at 67. Mishkin provides
a full discussion of this point in Mishkin & Morris, supra note 25, at 80-81.
65. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 67.
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fixed, certain body of authoritative rules which courts mechanically
(and thus impartially) “apply” or “find.” The symbol of a “government
of laws and not of men” is a potent force in society.66
The undoubted success of Mishkin’s Foreword lay in its ability to deploy
professional reason to fashion legal rules that would reinforce the symbolism
necessary to maintain the rule of law. By drawing important distinctions
between appellate review and collateral review, Mishkin sought to create a
principled structure of decision making that would give the Court the necessary
freedom to adjudicate prospectively and yet that would not seem to endow the
Court with symbolic power to engage in prospective lawmaking. He proposed
an analytic framework for defining the scope of collateral habeas review that
would enormously influence the future development of the doctrine67 and that
would liberate the Court to develop constitutional principles of criminal
procedure in ways that would have only prospective effect. The task, as
Mishkin defined it, was to use professional reason to construct principles that
would “reinforce—or at least not . . . weaken further—the general conception
of the Court as a court,” and that would “strengthen rather than . . . undermine
the symbols that help it to gain and maintain the support on which it
depends.” 68
Mishkin’s Foreword successfully deployed professional reason in order to
refashion the law in ways that would fortify the social preconditions of the rule
of law. But underlying this success lay dangerous conceptual instabilities.
Mishkin associated popular beliefs with an emotional regime of symbols that
could be reconciled with actual legal principles only through careful
manipulation and management.69 The social symbols evoked in the Foreword
seemed immune from rational persuasion; they were susceptible to influence, if
at all, only by the dumb weight of inarticulate experience, by what Mishkin,

66. Mishkin & Morris, supra note 25, at 81.
67. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989). See Toby J. Heytens, Managing
Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 Yale L.J. 922, 975-76, 986-87 (2006); A.
Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 34 n.204 (2002); Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap:
Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 203, 236-38 (1998); Kermit Roosevelt III,
A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 Conn. L. Rev.
1075, 1123 (1999); Casenote, Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1642, 1646-47 (2005).
68. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 69.
69. In response to the objection that “attempts to preserve” the symbolic view of law
“involve elements of deception,” Mishkin wrote:
I hold no brief for obscuring truth from any one who wishes to learn and who will
“take the trouble to understand.” At the same time, I see no affirmative virtue in the
destruction of essentially sound and valuable symbols in order to promulgate a part
of a more sophisticated — and indeed over-all more accurate — general view. Such
partial truths do not necessarily represent a gain in wisdom over the more elementary
general view, and the destruction of the symbol does involve real loss.
Id. at 63 n.29.
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quoting Felix Cohen, characterized as “the normative power of the actual.”70
By manipulating the inarticulate experience of actual practices, the legal system
could reinforce or undermine the social symbols upon which the legitimacy of
the rule of law rested.71
Mishkin believed that only symbols possessed the power to sustain
essential shared political values, like the rule of law. A society could change
only if its symbols could evolve. In the Foreword, and for his entire career as a
scholar and a teacher, Mishkin was thus powerfully drawn to Alfred North
Whitehead’s observation that
[t]he art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the
symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that
the code serves those purpose which satisfy an enlightened reason.
Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with
freedom of revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or
from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows.72
In truth, however, Mishkin offered little or no account of how
“enlightened reason” could alter the symbol of the “Blackstonian concept.”
Instead Mishkin’s concern was to protect the strength of that symbol by
structuring law so as to reduce the “appearance” that the law was in conflict
with it.73 Mishkin essentially conceived symbols as receptive to the shock of
experience but not to the force of rational persuasion. For Mishkin, therefore, a
deep and impassible divide separated the principled analytics of professional
reason from the emotional and experiential logic of symbols, upon which the
authority and legitimacy of the Court necessarily depended.
The fierce dilemma uncovered by Mishkin in his article analyzing the
Nixon decision is thus already implicit in his Foreword, written nine years
before. In his discussion of Nixon, Mishkin conceived the Court as having to
choose between following the dictates of professional reason and following the
symbolic logic of legitimacy. Although Mishkin’s Foreword had deftly solved
this dilemma by postulating ways that professional reason could be drafted into

70. Id. at 71. As Mishkin put it, “that which is law tends by its very existence to generate
a sense of being also that which ought to be the law.” Id. See also Mishkin, supra note 27, at 681
n.6 (“To be sure, an individual is frequently enough influenced . . . by an idea of what his job
ought to be. But that, in turn, is most often molded in large part by his impression of what the
position in fact is.”). For a use of this insight in teaching constitutional law that is indebted to
Mishkin’s own teaching, see Neil S. Siegel, Some Modest Uses of Transnational Legal
Perspectives in First-Year Constitutional Law, 56 J. Legal Educ. 201 (2006).
71. In Mishkin & Morris, supra note 25, at 79-87, Mishkin applied virtually the same
analysis to the question of stare decisis. Mishkin stressed the importance of preserving “an
appearance of continuity in doctrine.” Id. at 87. Mishkin noted that the importance of this
appearance was as significant “for members of the legal profession” as for the general public. Id.
72. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 62 n.26 (quoting Alfred North Whitehead:
Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927)). See Mishkin & Morris, supra note 25, at iii, 8184.
73. See supra note 71.
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the service of symbolic logic, Nixon illustrated that there were important
circumstances where no such ingenious solution was available. In Nixon, the
Court was put to a tragic choice between the substance of law and the
appearance of law, between the logic of professional reason and the emotional
logic of symbolism. The only possible option was to choose in a manner
designed to minimize the overall damage, a choice that plainly left Mishkin
deflated and unsatisfied at the end of his article.
There are elements in the Foreword that point in a quite different
direction. In one passage Mishkin observed that part of the truth in the
Blackstonian concept was that courts articulated “particular clear implications
of values so generally shared in the society that the process might well be
characterized as declaring a preexisting law.”74 He also argued that principles
of judicial decision-making ought to be formulated so as to moderate “the
possibility that judge-made law may move too far away from community-held
values.”75 In these observations Mishkin did not postulate a logical opposition
between reason and symbols, but instead seemed to imagine a dialectic between
professional reason and popular beliefs, a dialectic that could sustain the
legitimation of legal institutions.
Alexander Bickel dedicated his career to exploring the possible structures
of such a dialectical interaction between professional reason and popular
values.76 But the cost of this approach was to loosen the autonomy of
professional reason by assimilating it to frankly political elements like
statesmanship and expediency.77 Mishkin refused to pay this price. He insisted
on maintaining the highest professional standards of craft, with the
consequence that his imagination persistently gravitated toward an ineluctable
tension between professional reason and popular myth. When, fifteen years
after his Foreword, he sought to understand the Court’s attempt to conceive
and remedy sex discrimination, he viewed the Court’s decisions as “efforts to
eradicate not only real sexual inequality but symbolic stereotypes as well.”78
74. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 60 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 72.
76. See generally Bickel, supra note 30; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court
and the Idea of Progress 91 (1970); Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent
(1975).
77. This was the tack taken by Bickel primarily in his later work, in The Supreme Court
and the Idea of Progress, supra note 76, and in The Morality of Consent, supra note 76. In
Bickel’s earlier work, like The Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 30, he advocated that the
Court deploy “the passive virtues,” such as standing doctrine, in order to protect legal principles
from being warped by the need to maintain public legitimation. In an early article Mishkin himself
anticipated and advocated this use of the passive virtues. See Mishkin, supra note 27. For a recent
example of scholarship stressing the Court’s use of avoidance techniques to preserve principle
during a period of anti-Communist hysteria, see Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory
Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 397, 401-402 (2005).
78. Paul J. Mishkin, Equality, 43 Law & Contemp. Probs. 51, 62 (Summer 1980).
“Though this may appear to stress form over substance, the form in this instance is not trivial.” Id.
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Mishkin of course added that it “is not only inevitable but necessary and
proper” for the Court to exercise this kind of “political sensitivity,” in part to
maintain “the Court’s legitimacy and capacity to make . . . choices for
society.”79
The implicit opposition between reality and appearance, between reason
and symbolism, lay at the root of Mishkin’s very conceptualization of the
problem. He would recur time and again to the dilemma he had uncovered in
the Nixon decision: How ought the Court act when fidelity to the norms of
professional reason essential to its “proper”80 functioning would undermine the
conditions of its own legitimation?
IV
Beleaguered by the Gap: Affirmative Action
and a Heartfelt CRI dU COEUR
Mishkin’s unblinking appreciation of the potential antinomy between
professional and popular beliefs led him to remarkable insights about the nature
of American judicial practice. This was nowhere more sublimely illustrated
than in his discussion of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,81 the
decision in which the Supreme Court first established constitutional standards
for affirmative action in higher education. The case involved a challenge to the
affirmative action program of the medical school of the University of
California, Davis. The program explicitly set aside sixteen places for minority
students out of a class of one hundred.82 Mishkin had drafted the primary brief
for the University, arguing that even though the University used race as a
criterion of admission, “the standard of strict judicial scrutiny” did not apply83
in the context of efforts to “counteract [the] effects of generations of pervasive
discrimination against discrete and insular minorities.”84 The Supreme Court
fractured three ways, with the dispositive opinion authored by Justice Powell
for himself alone.
Powell rejected Mishkin’s argument that racial classifications in the
context of affirmative action should be immune from strict scrutiny. He
concluded that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently

at 61.
79. Id. at 63-64. As with the issue of self-legitimation, see supra note 41, Mishkin did not
explain why the Court should make fundamental value choices for American society. Instead, he
seemed to accept as given that it is the “function of the Court” to be “arbiter of our nation’s most
significant disputes.” Mishkin, supra note 27, at 680.
80. Mishkin & Morris, supra note 25, at v.
81. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
82. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
83. Brief for Petitioner, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76811) [hereinafter University of California Brief in Bakke], 1977 WL 189474, at *12.
84. Id. at *2.
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suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”85 He also
declined Mishkin’s invitation to justify affirmative action in higher education in
terms of the remedial logic of past discrimination.86 Powell instead offered a
unique and highly innovative rationale that turned on the “academic freedom”
of universities to choose a student body that would ensure “‘wide exposure’ to
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples,” so
that universities could fulfill their “mission” of selecting “those students who
will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas.’”87 He conceptualized
diversity as serving a compelling educational interest.
Powell offered a special definition of diversity. He argued that within the
context of education, diversity did not imply “simple ethnic diversity, in which
85. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.).
86. The first sentence of Mishkin’s brief for the University of California in Bakke frames
the issue precisely: “The outcome of this controversy will decide for future decades whether
blacks, Chicanos and other insular minorities are to have meaningful access to higher education
and real opportunities to enter the learned professions, or are to be penalized indefinitely by the
disadvantages flowing from previous pervasive discrimination.” University of California Brief in
Bakke, at *13. In its Summary of Argument, the University of California describes the historical
growth of this remedial perspective:
One of the things in which the nation may take great pride since the end of World
War II has been its willingness to address in actions, rather than simply words, the
racial injustices that are the unhappier parts of our legacy. . . . The commitment to
relegate the lingering burdens of the past to the past has run deeply and widely
throughout the country, among a great many of its institutions.
....
. . . [T]oward the end of the last decade, many governmental and private
institutions, including this Court, came concurrently to the realization that a real
effort to deal with many of the facets of the legacy of past racial discrimination
unavoidably requires remedies that are attentive to race, that color is relevant today if
it is to be irrelevant tomorrow. This discovery and response was found in many
sectors of society; the school desegregation area was a major arena, but the same
phenomenon was found in employment, housing, and many other areas, including
professional education.
Id. at *8-*10.
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (opinion of Powell, J.). In his brief Mishkin had in passing
proposed a similar argument sounding in diversity and academic freedom:
The relevant point is that the citizens of the state have chosen the University as the
entity with responsibility for grappling with the intractable problems of choosing the
optimum mix of students for the maximum benefit of education in the school, of
contribution to the profession, and ultimately to the society. Intrusive judicial review
interferes drastically with that process of democratic government. Such interference
should be reserved for the comparatively rare instances when circumstances compel
it, and such circumstances are not presented by this case. An effort by the judiciary,
under the rubric of strict judicial scrutiny, to fashion admissions standards is very
likely to lead to the kinds of mistakes made by the court below. In this instance, it
would also gravely harm the healthy “federalism” now presented by a system under
which universities across the country are permitted to fashion their own programs
without any stultifying central controls.
University of California Brief in Bakke, at *76. See also id. at *76 n.74 (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“. . . It is the business of a
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be
members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an
undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element.” 88
Powell concluded that universities could create admissions criteria in
which “race or ethnic background” was a “‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s
file,” 89 but not admissions criteria in which race would “insulate the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.”90 The latter
would deny each applicant their “right to individualized consideration without
regard to . . . race.”91 Powell was explicit that “[s]o long as the university
proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for
judicial interference in the academic process.”92 Affirmative action programs
would be protected even if a university, in awarding applicants a “plus” based
on their race, paid “some attention” to the number of minority students they

88. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id. Powell explained:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential
contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared,
for example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is
thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism.
Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique work or service
experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of
overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other
qualifications deemed important. In short, an admissions program operated in this
way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the
weight attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon
the “mix” both of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class.
Id. at 317-18.
91. Id. at 318 n.52. Powell argued that a program that merely gives individuals a “plus”
for their race
treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The applicant who
loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a “plus” on the
basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for
that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar
nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications
would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to
complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers race only as
one factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated—but no less effective—means
of according racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner’s preference program and not denied
in this case. No such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or
ethnic background is simply one element—to be weighed fairly against other
elements—in the selection process.
Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
92. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
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admitted.93 Because the affirmative action program at the U.C. Davis Medical
School did not purport to give applicants individualized consideration, but
instead explicitly set aside sixteen slots dedicated to the admission of racial
minorities, the program created “the functional equivalent of a quota system.” 94
For this reason, Powell deemed the Davis program unconstitutional.
Although Mishkin lost on both major arguments he had advanced to the
Court, he understood almost at once that Powell’s opinion in Bakke “preserved”
affirmative action programs in higher education, and that “this outcome could
be anticipated, and I think it was the outcome intended by the Court.”95 The
Court had not “giv[en] each party an equal half of the loaf”; on the contrary,
because most affirmative action programs did not (or did not need to) use the
features Justice Powell found fatal, Bakke’s primary effect, “by far, was to
sustain race-conscious special admissions programs throughout the nation.” 96
Mishkin had lost the battle, but he had won the war.
Yet Mishkin was troubled because he believed that Powell’s opinion
rested on an obvious fallacy. Powell asserted that an affirmative action program
that awarded candidates merely a “plus” for race was “a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy,”97 so that “an applicant who loses out on
the last available seat to another candidate receiving a ‘plus’ on the basis of
ethnic background . . . . would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”98 But Mishkin immediately realized that
this assertion could not be true. How could “the reasoning and ‘principle’ [it]
contained . . . be applied generally”?99 If the University of California, Berkeley
were to decide that there were too many Asian-American students on campus,
so that to promote diversity it would award each Asian-American applicant a
“minus” in their application, it could not be doubted that disadvantaged AsianAmerican applicants would have a “basis” on which to claim that their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause had been violated, and it was plain that the
Court, Justice Powell included, would so declare.100
From the perspective of legal principle, the constitutionality of the “plus”
could be distinguished from the almost certain unconstitutionality of the
“minus” only on the ground that the “plus” was necessary to redress the present
effects of past discrimination. This is the argument that Mishkin had advanced

93. Id. at 323.
94. Id. at 318.
95. Mishkin, supra note 78, at 58.
96. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 921-22.
97. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.).
98. Id. The question of whether so-called “benign” racial classifications ought to count as
racial classifications was in fact hotly debated in the decades before Bakke. See, e.g., Reva B.
Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
Over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1524-25 (2004).
99. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 925.
100. Id.
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in his brief, but Powell in his opinion went out of his way to repudiate it.
Powell therefore wrote an opinion offering reasons that could not apply to
future cases. His opinion appeared to exemplify the kind of “ad hoc
evaluation” 101 that Hart and Wechsler deplored as contrary to the very life of
the law.102 The question that fascinated Mishkin was why Powell had
deliberately constructed an opinion that was “to the largest degree a matter of
form rather than substance.” 103
Mishkin used the antinomy between professional reason and popular
perception to construct his answer. At the time of Bakke, affirmative action
“was one of the most heated and polarized issues in the nation.”104 Powell’s
“proclamation of ambivalence”105 was remarkable because it “both
symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held moral
claims on both sides.”106 It “expressed clear support for the view that racial or
ethnic lines are inherently constitutionally suspect,”107 while simultaneously
declaring that affirmative action programs “might generally continue.”108 By
genuinely reaching out to both sides of the controversy, “[t]he Court took what
was one of the most heated and polarized issues in the nation, and by its
handling defused much of that heat.”109 It avoided the “legislative backlash” 110
that likely would have occurred had the Court completely rejected “the claim
advanced by Mr. Bakke and his supporters,”111 and yet it also provided a
charter by which affirmative action programs could continue to function in
higher education. In thematizing how Bakke could alter the terms of public
debate by fashioning a compromise moving between two poles of intense
constitutional controversy, Mishkin anticipated the work of later constitutional
theorists who have sought to demonstrate how the Court has in the past
intervened in just this way to establish constitutional legitimacy in the midst of
intense constitutional controversy.112

101. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 12.
102. Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 395, 396 (1987) (“Indeed, at times, I think he may have been willing to sacrifice a little
consistency in legal theory in order to reach for justice in a particular case.”).
103. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 926.
104. Id. at 929.
105. Id. at 917.
106. Id. at 922.
107. Id. at 923.
108. Id. at 922.
109. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 929. In light of subsequent disputes about Proposition 209
in California and similar controversies elsewhere, it is questionable how much heat was actually
defused, and for how long.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 98, at 1544-46; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 Calif.
L. Rev. 1323 (2006).
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Most puzzlingly, Powell’s opinion in Bakke struggled to construct a
constitutional rationale that would validate affirmative action programs only if
they deployed a complex, “destabilizing,”113 and largely fictional system of
“individualized consideration,” even though it was apparent upon inspection
that such a system would produce virtually the same “net operative results” as
the explicit “set-aside” plan of U.C. Davis.114 Mishkin explained this seemingly
strange feature of Powell’s opinion by suggesting that “[t]he indirectness of the
less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages . . . in terms
of . . . the felt impact of their operation over time.”115
Even when the net operative results may be the same, the use of
euphemisms may serve valuable purposes; as do legal fictions, they
may facilitate the acceptance of needed measures. . . .
Indirectness may also have significant advantages in muting public
reactions to, and possible resentment of, the granting of preference on
racial lines. The use of overt numbers, whether stated as literal quotas
or as “set-asides” for qualified applicants, greatly tends to trigger the
symbolism of the infamous “numerus clausus” and other exclusionary
devices of past invidious religious, ethnic, and racial discrimination.
The incorporation of such features in an institutional admissions
program continuing indefinitely from year to year, tends continually to
113. Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke, in Race and Representation: Affirmative
Action 16-17 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
114. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 928. Mishkin was surely correct to observe that “in the vast
majority of cases” the “‘plus’-type system . . . will inevitably work . . . without significant
difference from the ‘set-aside’ format.” Id. at 927 n.73. He explained why:
There is, after all, no objective way to compute the “edge” to be given to race or
ethnic background as compared to any other factor. If an admissions committee is
allowed to give a “plus” for race as a means of achieving diversity in the student
body, the “plus” must be large enough to make a difference in the outcome in some
cases. But if that is so, isn’t it clear that the size of the “plus” will determine the
number of minority students admitted? In those circumstances, it is virtually
inevitable that the authorities that determine the size of the “plus” will set that size in
terms of the number of minority students likely to be produced at the level set. Since
that is so, the use of a “plus” may simply be a slightly less precise, and less direct,
method of determining the proportion of minority students who will be given
preferential admission.
Id. at 926.
115. Id. at 928. Mishkin wrote:
The description of race as simply “another factor” among a lot of others considered
in seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate
and different and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly
separate and structured systems might have the opposite effect. These perceptions
can have important consequences for the schools and their students, both majority
and minority. They can facilitate or hamper the development of relationships among
individuals and groups; they can advance or retard the educational process for all—
including, particularly, minority students whose self-image is most crucially
involved.
Id. Mishkin conceded that set-aside programs like the one at U.C. Davis are “most likely to rearouse and maintain awareness of distinctions based on race, thus having potential to retard
achievement of the objective of eliminating race-consciousness itself.” Mishkin, supra note 78, at
59.
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keep alive consciousness of the program and the relevance of race
therein; it tends to maintain and exacerbate latent and overt hostility to
these efforts to overcome the effects of past racial discrimination. A
program formulated along the lines Justice Powell’s opinion approves
would, by the very lack of “sharp edges,” avoid such visibility in its
operations and tend to enhance the acceptability of the program.116
This discussion of the symbolic and cultural effects of different forms of
affirmative action programs closely tracks Mishkin’s earlier analysis of the
symbolic effects of the claimed judicial power to engage in prospective
lawmaking. Although the issue in Bakke concerned social attitudes toward race,
as distinct from the social perceptions of judicial legitimacy at issue in
Linkletter, Mishkin’s treatment of the question was nevertheless structurally
analogous. His point was that differently designed affirmative action programs
with otherwise identical “net operative results” would differentially affect
preexisting social beliefs.117
Mishkin’s scrutiny of this issue is nothing short of brilliant. His insight
explains why, a quarter century later, the Court would simultaneously uphold
affirmative action programs for higher education and constitutionally bar
universities from revealing the precise extent of the “plus” that they actually
award on the basis of race.118 It elucidates why in dealing with questions
involving the intersection of race and electoral design the Court has explicitly
concluded that “appearances do matter.”119 It anticipates the work of a later
generation of scholars who interpret the Court’s equal protection decisions as
driven by the necessity of shaping interventions to an expressive form that will
allay “the fear of racial ‘balkanization’”120 while simultaneously sustaining the
116. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 927-28 (footnote omitted).
117. Accord John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 55 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 20 (2003) (“The
burying of racial preferences in ‘plus’ factors for certain individuals obscures and softens the
sense of injury that even the most dedicated proponents of affirmative action must acknowledge
will be felt by those who are disadvantaged for reasons they cannot control.”).
118. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003). For a discussion, see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 68-76 (2003).
119. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). The tension between the appearance and the
reality of the law was a topic that was much discussed in the two decades after Brown. See, e.g.,
John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Inequality for the Negro—The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363 (1966):
We are constantly forced to compromise the strong moral claims of the Negro,
because the structure of the institutions of our society interfere[s] with the
implementation of what otherwise might appear to be a just result. Moreover, the
necessity of considering not only the reality of governmental action, but also its
appearance, may justify the belief that in this area we cannot afford complete
openness and frankness on the part of the legislature, executive or judiciary. Though
this may shock some, it perhaps is an inevitable consequence of our history. One
should not expect to find within what would be our traditional morality a just cure
for three hundred years of immorality.
Id. at 410.
120. Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 669, 691
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constitutionality of legislative redress for the present effects of past
discrimination.121
Mishkin demonstrated that the eccentric and slippery logic of Powell’s
distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional affirmative action
programs played an important role in Powell’s effort to achieve “a wise and
politic resolution of an exceedingly difficult problem.”122 It allowed Justice
Powell “to equate race with other variables” that “do not carry the same
emotional freight as racial or ethnic lines.”123 In the end Mishkin recognized
that Powell had imposed constitutional requirements on affirmative action
programs that would significantly diminish their potential to “exacerbate latent
and overt” racial “hostility.” 124
In many dimensions, therefore, Powell’s opinion represented “a major,
successful accomplishment.” 125 Yet Mishkin was not satisfied. On the contrary,
he asked, “if I cannot find an analytically sound principle to support [the]
result, what justification do I have to support such action by the Supreme
Court?”126 The question led Mishkin to conclude his analysis with a heartfelt
cri du coeur:
I am not so absolute or so unworldly as to say that results may not
at times be a sufficient justification. . . . That is in one sense an
essential element in successful government. But it is at the same time
an exceedingly dangerous one. Unless cabined, it is an argument that
will always justify desired social outcomes regardless of principled
justifications.

(1998).
121. See Post, supra note 118, at 74-76; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration,
Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195, 1236 (2002) (“The Court prefers
that, when states consider race, their actions are ambiguous enough to be explained in other
ways.”); Issacharoff, supra note 120, at 693 (“[W]here the racial considerations in student
selection and assignment are too central, too visible, and too at odds with longstanding community
practices, they are almost certain to fail.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny
and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1569, 1601
(2002); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483,
506-07 (1993).
122. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 929.
123. Id. at 924.
124. Id. at 928.
125. Id. at 930. “I take the view that special admissions programs advance the cause of
racial equality in this country. Without them, the channels of upward mobility for racial minorities
would remain constricted; the nation’s medical schools, top law schools, and status professions
generally would remain virtually all-white. The resolution of the ‘American Dilemma’ would be
retarded, in the present and for the future. The Bakke decision preserved those programs.”
Mishkin, supra note 78, at 57.
126. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 930. See Jeffries, supra note 117, at 2 (“And throughout,
his argument seemed devoid of any broad consistency that might be called principle. . . .
Considered purely as a matter of craft—of consistency with precedent, coherency as doctrine, and
clarity of result—Powell’s Bakke opinion must be judged a failure.”).

463E5D21-49B6-080670.DOC

24

5/6/2007 3:24 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:TBD

But how could it be cabined here? I cannot assert that I believe the
safety of the United States depended on one outcome or the other in
Bakke. I can say that the case was an extraordinary one, in terms of
public awareness and concern as well as in terms of the importance
and difficulty of the issues. But such “extraordinary” cases are not so
uncommon on the dockets of the United States Supreme Court, and the
line between them and the run of other cases is by no means easily
demarcated or maintained. It is true that in Bakke racial relations were
importantly under stress. It is also true that race relations are our most
durable domestic crisis. Is it therefore sufficient to limit the
“exception” to racial matters? Is it justifiable?
. . . I have tried but I have not been able to come to resolution.
That may be an unorthodox way to conclude a formal lecture. But that
is how I must, and do, conclude this one.127
Even more acutely than in his earlier discussion of United States v. Nixon,
which he explicitly invoked,128 Mishkin ended his Bakke lecture on a note of
solemn uncertainty in the face of unspeakable indeterminacy. He affirmed the
importance of maintaining the integrity of professional reason, and he also
affirmed that the social consequences of court decisions in particular cases
could outweigh a single-minded pursuit of that integrity. Because there was no
meta-principle to determine which objective a court should pursue, Mishkin
evidently regarded these two affirmations as incompatible. His professed
attitude toward Bakke was therefore one of unresolved ambivalence.
Unqualified praise for Powell’s choice to achieve an optimal social outcome at
the sacrifice of “principled justifications” would contribute to the self-fulfilling
prophecy of legal realism and would encourage courts to disregard the
principles that in Mishkin’s view constituted the spine of the law.129 Yet rigid
fidelity to principle, regardless of consequences, would risk intolerable social
costs, ranging from the delegitimation of the Court to catastrophic racial
tension.130 Viewing this tension as unresolvable, and perhaps concluding that
further scholarly attention could only make matters worse, Mishkin assumed a
disciplined and stoic silence.

127. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 930-31.
128. Id. at 931 n.82.
129. In 1954 Mishkin had scored “commentaries on the work of the Court” for carrying “an
oversimplified ‘realist’ flavor” and suggesting that “decisions were in fact exclusively the product
of each individual’s politics and sympathies.” Mishkin, supra note 27, at 682. Such commentary,
he argued, “helped to bring about a judiciary much closer to” the portrait presented by legal
realism. Id.
130. Mishkin wrote that rejecting all use of race “would have produced a disastrous setback
in race and other relations in our society.” Mishkin, supra note 28, at 929 n.78. Two decades later,
John Jeffries would record similar views, Jeffries, supra note 117, at 6-7, though it was easier for
him openly to approve Powell’s “sacrifice of cogency for wisdom.” Id. at 21.
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V
The Tension Between Professional Reason and Popular Legitimacy:
A Weak Form of the Dilemma
Underlying this silence was the sharp antinomy that Mishkin postulated
between professional reason and public perception. In his discussion of Nixon,
Mishkin saw that because the legitimacy of the Court depends upon public
perception, and because public perception follows the logic of symbolism
rather than professional reason, the very legitimacy of the Court could depend
upon its acting in ways that were inconsistent with professional reason.
Mishkin expanded this insight in his evaluation of Bakke. He saw that the
capacity of law to achieve socially desirable outcomes could depend upon its
following a logic of symbolism rather than professional reason. But because
Mishkin also questioned whether the Court could “be justified in acting” unless
it was able to advance “a principled basis which would support acceptance” of
its decision,131 he faced a seemingly insoluble dilemma.
This dilemma can assume two distinct forms—a weak and a strong form.
The weak form of the dilemma arises whenever courts are tempted to decide
cases in ways that are responsive to the logic of popular values rather than to
norms of professional practice like reason-giving or applying previously
articulated reasons. The strong form of the dilemma arises whenever courts are
tempted to adopt the logic of popular values in a manner that affirmatively
contradicts or undermines norms of professional practice. In this section, we
argue that the weak form of the dilemma should not, when properly conceived,
be viewed as a dilemma; it merely illustrates that norms of professional craft
are not autonomous, but are constantly and properly in dialogue with popular
beliefs. In the section that follows, we argue that although the strong form of
the dilemma can sometimes force courts to confront genuinely difficult choices,
it does not so much reflect an antimony between professional reason and
popular beliefs as it illustrates unresolved tensions concerning the purposes of
law itself.
The weak form of the dilemma assumes that adjudicative law, qua law,
requires the articulation of reason and principle, so that court decisions that do
not justify their judgments by reasons are not properly legal.132 This
assumption, however, is questionable. No less a jurist than Oliver Wendell
Holmes once famously remarked that
[i]t is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and
determines the principle afterwards. . . . [L]awyers, like other men,
frequently see well enough how they ought to decide on a given state
of facts without being very clear as to the ratio decidendi. In cases of

131. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 909.
132. For a recent forceful statement of this view, see Jesse H. Choper, The Political
Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 Duke L.J. 1457, 1478 (2005).
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first impression Lord Mansfield’s often-quoted advice to the business
man who was suddenly appointed judge, that he should state his
conclusions and not give his reasons, as his judgment would probably
be right and the reasons certainly wrong, is not without its application
to more educated courts.133
If it can intelligibly be said that a decision is “right” although its reasons are
“wrong,” then it is at a minimum intelligible to say that a decision can be
justified even though its author has neither the wits nor the will to articulate the
principle for which it stands. And if judges commonly and properly make
decisions without being aware of the principles for which they stand, then not
only does the professional practice of judging go beyond mere reason-giving,
but the law itself must perform functions that do not require reason-giving. 134
Holmes and Mansfield suggest that a judge’s most fundamental responsibility
is to get a decision right, rather than to decide it according to principles.
Whether a decision can be “right” even though it cannot be justified by an
articulable principle depends upon the purposes of law. A decision can be
“right” if it satisfies a proper purpose of the law, so long as that purpose can be
fulfilled without the necessity of articulating a principle. Mishkin hints at such
a purpose in his Foreword when he suggests that a fundamental object of law is
to give expression to the “particular clear implications of values so generally
shared in the society that the process might well be characterized as declaring a
preexisting law.”135 In this passage, Mishkin does not conceive popular beliefs
as an intrinsically irrational universe of symbols, but instead as a meaningful
world of social values.
It is very frequently said that a major purpose of law is to lend official
state sanction to “the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious.”136 This
conception of law has been common at least since the work of Friedrich Karl
von Savigny.137 Sometimes social values take the form of standards, with
“contextual”138 meanings that can fully be known only in their application.
133. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 1
(1870).
134. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 659 (1995) (“[W]hen
context, case-by-case decisionmaking, and flexibility are thought important, the benefits of
requiring decisionmakers to give reasons do not come without a price.”)
135. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 60 (footnote omitted). See supra text accompanying note
74.
136. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
137. See, e.g., Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for
Legislation and Jurisprudence 27 (Abraham Hayward trans., Arno Press 1975) (1831).
Savigny stresses the “organic connection of law with the being and character” of a people, so that
law “is subject to the same movement and development as every other popular tendency.” Id. For
a modern version of this position, see Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 10
(1965).
138. Philip Selznick, Foundations of Communitarian Liberalism, Responsive
Community, 16, 21 (Fall 1994).
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Sometimes, however, they take the form of intuitive “concrete
understandings”139 that do not rise even to the level of generalizations, much
less rules. Holmes and Mansfield acknowledge that judges can properly decide
cases based on just such inarticulable intuitions. They apparently believe that
this is necessary for law to serve its function of enforcing social values.140
Of course it is unusual for law to integrate social values in the form of
such inarticulable intuitions. Far more frequently courts enforce social values
by transforming them into legal standards—like privacy or offensiveness—
which routinely count as legal reasons or principles. Because the exact meaning
of a standard is indeterminate until the circumstances of its concrete
application, a standard always incorporates considerations that cannot be fully
articulated or made explicit. These considerations come from outside the law,
so that law which uses standards necessarily renders itself permeable to the
influence of implicit social norms.141 Standards are thus always situated at the
nexus of professional reason and popular beliefs.
This silent incorporation of implicit social values does not undermine the
capacity of standards, or even necessarily of inarticulate intuitions, to fulfill
rule-of-law values like consistency, predictability, stability, reliance, and
transparency. Although compliance with explicit principles is one way of
realizing these values, so also is compliance with widely shared social
norms.142 Certainly the common law operates on this premise when it expects
persons to have the capacity to guide their behavior on the basis of
indeterminate standards like “reasonableness,” 143 whose meaning derives from
innumerable implicit considerations. Many legal standards of conduct seek to
guide behavior in this way,144 and in some contexts standards may be more
139. Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise
of Community 323 (1992).
140. This function of law is captured by Paul Bohannan’s notion of “double
institutionalization,” by which he meant that law must reinstitutionalize general social norms. See
Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 Am. Anthropologist 33, 35-36 (1965). Cf.
Schauer, supra note 134, at 650 (“The argument for the nonexistence of commitment to reasons in
legal practice likely stems from a common law tradition of particularity. Law is not about
generality, the tradition holds, but about particular situations and decisions in cases that the
infinite variety of human experience ensures will never repeat themselves.”).
141. For a discussion, see Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and
Social Orders, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 491, 494-98 (1994).
142. See Neil S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 Geo. L.J. 1645, 1666 (2005)
(reviewing Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in War Time From the
Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (2004)) (“[C]lear rules [are] insufficient. We
also require a strong sense of what counts as the relevant category—for example, what conduct
our legal culture signifies by use of the term ‘torture.’ That meaning must be so deeply shared that
it resolutely resists collapse into underlying rationales or hijacking for extrinsic rationalizations.
The repressive forces Professor Stone means to control are so powerful and pernicious precisely
because they tend to undermine that shared sense of meaning.” (footnote omitted)).
143. See Post, supra note 141, at 499-503.
144. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957 (1989).
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effective at achieving rule-of-law values than explicit legal rules.145 The latter
may be opaque to persons who do not possess the expertise of legal
professionals.
It follows that judges who justify their decisions by reference to
contextual and shared social values may more effectively subject themselves to
the discipline of popular scrutiny than judges who justify their decisions by
reference to the dictates of technical professional reason. Because the public
may be unable to ascertain whether judges are in fact applying professional
reasons articulated in past decisions, but are able to ascertain whether judges
are accurately applying social values, the incorporation of contextual and
shared social values into the law may advance the goal of disciplining judges to
the virtue of consistency. It may also more immediately and powerfully justify
state coercion than appeals to professional reason and principle.146
This suggests that the weak form of the dilemma postulated by Mishkin
may be no dilemma at all. If the notion that adjudicative law should act
according to reasons and principles means that judges should act only on the
basis of reasons and principles that are explicit and determinate, the
requirement is false to actual practice and unnecessary to the fulfillment of
rule-of-law values and the justification of state coercion. If, on the other hand,
the requirement that adjudicative law should act according to reasons and
principles means that judges should act only on the basis of reasons and
principles that derive from the logic of professional practice, as distinct from
the logic of general social values, the requirement is also false to actual practice
and unnecessary to the fulfillment of rule-of-law virtues and the justification of
state coercion. The first interpretation of the demand for principled adjudication
stresses the need for law to be transparently explicit and determinate; the
second emphasizes the need for law to separate itself from politics. While
transparency and professionalism are no doubt important values in the law, it is
simply fantasy to imagine that law can be fully determinate or fully
autonomous from popular beliefs.
It is especially important to resist the lure of this fantasy in the context of
constitutional law. The authority of the Constitution flows not only from its
status as law, but also from its status as the repository of our “fundamental
145. As one of us has written:
Nor is it self-evident as a general matter (the conventional wisdom notwithstanding)
that rules constrain behavior more than standards. Rules, which lack the chilling
effect imposed by standards, may free individuals to pursue counter-purposive
advantage right up to the line demarcated by the rule. Further, rules often leave gaps
or generate conflicts, rendering mechanical application difficult or impossible;
ostensibly vague standards, by contrast, may resonate with the constraining effect of
social norms. As it becomes increasingly apparent that rules generate unfair results
that turn on technicalities, moreover, the pressure on regulators and the regulated to
circumvent a rule-bound regime will increase. A clear rule constrains less insofar as
judges become less prepared to enforce it.
Siegel, supra note 142, at 1664-65 (footnotes omitted).
146. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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nature as a people,” which “is sacred and demands our respectful
acknowledgement.” 147 When Woodrow Wilson argued that “the Constitution of
the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its
spirit is always the spirit of the age,” 148 his point was that the Constitution must
be understood as an expression of the deepest values of the nation. The
Constitution has always veered between a document owned and articulated by
professional lawyers,149 and, in Franklin Roosevelt’s words, a “layman’s
charter” owned and articulated by the People themselves.150 As a charter of
national governance, the Constitution has always outrun the narrow confines of
professional legal reason.151
Constitutional law shares this instability, vibrating constantly between the
professional logic of reason and principle and the intuitive, implicit, and
contextual logic of fundamental social values. This is evident throughout the
Court’s decisions, whether one looks at the instability of legal concepts like
“classifications based upon race,”152 or the determination in federalism doctrine
of whether an activity is a “traditional subject of state concern,”153 or the
determination in First Amendment jurisprudence of whether expression should
be regarded as a “matter of public concern” 154 or classified as “commercial

147. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. Legal Educ. 167, 167-69
(1987).
148. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 69
(1908).
149. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
46 (1997) (“[I]nterpretation of the Constitution . . . is . . . essentially lawyers’ work—requiring a
close examination of text, history of the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial
precedent, and so forth.”). According to Justice Scalia, only “principle and logic” should
determine “the decisions of this Court.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). It is thus unsurprising that Scalia lambasted Powell’s opinion in Bakke for being
“thoroughly unconvincing as an honest, hard-minded, reasoned analysis of an important provision
of the Constitution.” Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We
Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 148.
150. The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman’s Document, Not a Lawyer’s
Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt
359, 367 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). See id. at 353: “[F]or one hundred and fifty years we
have had an unending struggle between those who would preserve this original broad concept of
the Constitution as a layman’s instrument of government and those who would shrivel the
Constitution into a lawyer’s contract.”
151. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943
(2003).
152. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 14-28 (2003).
153. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective,
59 Vand. L. Rev. 1629 (2006); Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 Sup. Ct.
Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 2008).
154. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 679-82
(1990).
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speech.”155 Every Court decision that “balances” or “weighs” incommensurate
and potentially incompatible values depends upon contextual interpretations
that are deeply influenced by implicit and inarticulate considerations
characteristic of social values.156 If such decisions are proper—and they are
pervasive in the life of our constitutional law—it is because constitutional law
draws authority from its expression of popular ideals.157
This implies that the Court, as the oracle of the Constitution, must always
be caught between the demand to interpret the Constitution on behalf of the
professional legal reason exemplified by “first-rate lawyers,”158 and the need to
interpret the Constitution so as to “speak before all others” about the nation’s
“constitutional ideals.”159 This tension has characterized constitutional law
almost since the beginning of the Republic. The Court has always been torn
between defining its audience as the community of professional lawyers, and
defining its audience as the general American public. In this tension lies the
strength and legitimacy of our constitutional law. Much would be lost were the
Court to abandon that tension in a quixotic quest for an adjudicatory process
fashioned solely from the stuff of autonomous, explicit, professional reason.160
155. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1,
17-18 (2000).
156. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale
L.J. 943 (1987).
157. Lower court decisions in the Court’s most recent encounter with race-conscious state
action are quite explicit about the constitutional pertinence of these ideals to questions of equal
protection jurisprudence. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426
F.3d 1162, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in result) (“Schoolmates often
become friends, rivals and romantic partners; learning to deal with individuals of different races in
these various capacities cannot help but foster the live-and-let-live spirit that is the essence of the
American experience.”), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); McFarland v.
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“Integrated schools,
better academic performance, appreciation for our diverse heritage and stronger, more competitive
public schools are consistent with central values and themes of American culture. Access to equal
and integrated schools has been an important national ethic ever since Brown v. Board of
Education established what Richard Kluger described as ‘nothing short of a reconsecration of
American ideals.’ What Kluger and others have articulated is that Brown’s symbolic, moral and
now historic significance may now far exceed its strictly legal importance. . . . Brown’s original
moral and constitutional declaration has survived to become a mainstream value of American
education and . . . the [School] Board’s interests are entirely consistent with these traditional
American values. They reinforce our intuitive sense that education is about a lot more than just the
‘three-R’s.’” (referencing Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board
of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 710 (1975))), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513
(6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5,
2006) (No. 05-915). For analysis of some of the equal protection issues implicated in these cases,
see generally Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 Duke L.J. 781 (2006).
158. Hart, supra note 3, at 101.
159. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
160. For a discussion, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1 (2003). Cf.
Jeffries, supra note 117, at 23 (“[I]t is startling to note how little either the insight or the impact of
Powell’s opinion in Bakke depended on his abilities as a lawyer. . . . [H]is achievement in Bakke
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VI
The Tension Between Professional Reason and Popular Legitimacy:
A Strong Form of the Dilemma
The strong form of the dilemma identified by Mishkin can not be so
satisfactorily resolved. It arises whenever courts are tempted to decide cases in
a manner that affirmatively contradicts or undermines the norms of professional
reason. Mishkin argues that a strong dilemma arose in Bakke because the Court
could achieve the value of reducing social tension over affirmative action only
if it could assert that affirmative action programs awarding every applicant
“individualized consideration” did not employ facial racial distinctions, which
was false.
It is helpful to ask at the outset why such a strong dilemma arises at all.
Assuming that reducing tension over affirmative action is a proper
constitutional value, why could not the Court in Bakke simply have announced
that it was distinguishing among affirmative action programs in a manner
designed to achieve that value, and so entirely have avoided any strong
dilemma? The Court could have said, for example, that for constitutional
purposes the difference in appearance between affirmative action programs that
give individualized consideration and affirmative action programs that
perpetuate quotas is constitutionally significant because the latter contribute far
more substantially to racial balkanization and are consequently more
controversial.161 Of course the plausibility of this principle would depend upon
its underlying empirics, but the essential point is that there is nothing about this
principle that would contradict professional norms. Hence this justification for
the Bakke opinion would not have created a strong dilemma. Why, by contrast,
was it thought necessary to announce a false legal principle in the context of the
claim that affirmative action programs awarding every applicant
“individualized consideration” did not employ facial racial distinctions? The
answer illuminates an essential but neglected function of our legal system, a
function that Mishkin’s focus on the logic of popular symbolism invites us to
theorize.
This function is clarified by J.L. Austin’s insight about the different
functions of speech.162 Speaking performs a locutionary act, which is to say
that it “utter[s] a sentence that has a particular meaning.”163 Speaking also
performs an illocutionary act, which is to say that in asserting a particular
came despite, not because of, the constraints of legal reasoning.”).
161. In the context of affirmative action in government contracting, for example, the Court
has explicitly crafted constitutional principles that distinguish among programs on the basis of
their capacity to achieve “[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is
irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement.” City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).
162. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 95-109 (2d ed. 1999).
163. Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 293, 295
(1993).
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meaning it enacts a particular kind of action, like promising, marrying,
deciding, etc. And speaking performs a perlocutionary act, which is to say that
it causes contingent effects in the world. Austin observes that the
“perlocutionary” force of speech turns on “what we bring about or achieve by
saying something, such as convincing, persuading, [or] deterring.”164
The locutionary aspect of speech is what makes it intelligible, the
illocutionary aspect is what it accomplishes in being spoken, and the
perlocutionary aspect is what it accomplishes by being spoken. Note
that because these are all aspects of speech rather than categories of
speech, the same utterance can have all three dimensions. Thus the
locutionary aspect of “I promise” makes the promise intelligible as a
promise; the illocutionary aspect produces the promise itself; and the
perlocutionary aspect produces effects in the listener, such as
reassurance or trust.165
When legal process jurisprudence celebrates the need for principles, it
conceives principles as having illocutionary force. The principles announced by
a judicial opinion have legal force merely by virtue of the fact that they have
been articulated as reasons for judicial action. If the Court in Bakke were
explicitly to state that the constitutionality of affirmative action programs
depended upon the extent to which they contribute to racial balkanization, the
statement would possess the illocutionary force of a new principle of
constitutional law.166 There would be no strong dilemma.
Notice, however, that the illocutionary force of such a legal principle can
not by itself reduce tension over affirmative action. The question of whether the
words of a court opinion have any particular empirical effect depends upon
their perlocutionary force. The perlocutionary force of a court opinion is a
matter of contingent causality that very much depends upon exactly how a
court speaks (among other things).167 Were the Court explicitly to announce
that it was classifying affirmative action programs with an eye to reducing
tension over affirmative action, the Court’s very announcement might
significantly affect whether its decision could achieve its desired impact: It is at
least as likely that the announcement would undermine the intended
perlocutionary effect of the opinion as enhance it.168
164. Austin, supra note 162, at 109.
165. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 869 n.554 (2002) (citation omitted).
166. For development of this point, see Siegel, supra note 157.
167. It is not necessary to assume that the public carefully parses Supreme Court opinions.
It is necessary to assume only that the content of the Court’s speech is relevant to the
perlocutionary effect of its holding. We acknowledge that the meaning of Court opinions is
conveyed to the public in complex, highly mediated ways.
168. This is why Mishkin, while “recogniz[ing] that wise and effective government may at
times require such indirection and less-than-full candor,” did not see how one could “proceed by
proclaiming in a Supreme Court opinion that this is what is happening.” Mishkin, supra note 28,
at 928. In other contexts, however, the explicit announcement of a perlocutionary objective might
not have a self-undermining effect. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
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Mishkin interpreted Bakke as written for the purpose of achieving the
perlocutionary goal of reducing social controversy over affirmative action. He
believed that this goal could be attained only if the Court’s opinion “both
symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held moral
claims on both sides.”169 To acknowledge the moral claims of those urging
color blindness, it was necessary to assert that all state programs based upon
race would be constitutionally disfavored and subject to strict scrutiny.
Actually to apply this principle, however, would undermine all affirmative
action programs. To sustain the moral claims of those who saw affirmative
action as necessary to overcome centuries of discrimination, Powell (in
Mishkin’s view) believed it necessary to assert that affirmative action programs
giving applicants “individualized consideration” were not based upon race.
Because this latter assertion could not be squared with the dictates of
professional reason, a strong dilemma arose.170
Mishkin thus argued that the strong dilemma in Powell’s Bakke opinion
came about because the only way the Court could achieve its desired
perlocutionary effect of reducing tension over affirmative action was to assert
illocutionary meanings that were inconsistent with professional principles. 171
This suggests that strong dilemmas arise when the Court seeks to fulfill a social
value by creating a perlocutionary effect attainable only by illocutionary
meanings that contradict professional reason.172 This is exactly the structure of
the strong dilemma that Mishkin identified in his analysis of United States v.
Nixon. He argued that the Court in Nixon sought to achieve the perlocutionary
effect of maintaining its own legitimacy, which the Court believed could be
accomplished only by illocutionary meanings that were inconsistent with
defensible principles of separation of powers.173 Because the Court’s legitimacy
229 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
169. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 922.
170. A quarter century later, Justice O’Connor sought to resolve this same strong dilemma
in a different way. Like Powell, she wished to authorize institutions of higher education to engage
in affirmative action. But, in contrast to Powell, she was willing to acknowledge that such
programs were based upon race. She nevertheless sought to vindicate and protect these programs
by applying the test of strict scrutiny in a manner that was so deferential as to be inconsistent with
the generally accepted meaning of the test. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Post,
supra note 118, at 57-58 and n.257.
171. From the perspective of perlocutionary effect, the general public was for Mishkin
merely the object of the Court’s benevolent manipulation. He did not seem concerned that
manipulation in law could corrode the integrity of the Court’s conversations with the country. See
supra note 69. This was perhaps because he did not perceive much value in the Court’s attempting
to converse with a public whose symbolic commitments were largely impervious to rational
persuasion.
172. Cf. Jeffries, supra note 117, at 25 (“Sometimes, there is indeed a wide gulf between
legal reasoning and political wisdom. Sometimes, the gap between the conventional criteria of
judging . . . and a politically far-sighted decision is unbridgeably large. Where that is true, there is
no easy melding of legal craft and political insight. The judge must choose between them.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
173. See supra Part II.
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is an empirically contingent fact, it can not simply be decreed though the
illocutionary force of the Court’s principles; it must be causally produced
through the impact of the Court’s words.
Mishkin’s concern with strong dilemmas, in other words, evidences his
focus on the potential tension between perlocutionary effect and illocutionary
force. This focus is immensely illuminating. Many modern theorists seek to
understand the dialogue provoked by the opinions of the Court; they conceive
the relationship between the Court and the public as a matter of rational
conversation.174 Mishkin, by contrast, invites us to imagine the full
perlocutionary force of the Court’s decisions, which goes far beyond their
rational content.175 He is concerned with how the structure and language of
Court decisions affect public opinion. Modern scholars might explore this
question with the tools of anthropology, cultural theory, or economics.
Although Mishkin used a relatively unsophisticated methodology that
emphasized irrational symbolism, the question he invites us to analyze is
essential to the legitimation of the legal system.
Most precisely formulated, Mishkin’s work focuses our attention on
dilemmas that arise when the Court seeks to attain a perlocutionary impact that
can be achieved only through the articulation of illocutionary meanings that are
inconsistent with the dictates of professional reason. Strong dilemmas have bite
because, despite claims to the contrary,176 courts must pay attention to the
perlocutionary effects of their opinions. This is because the legal system exists
to serve purposes for society at large—“to regulate behavior and to maintain
social cohesion as circumstances change.”177 In order to accomplish these
purposes, a court must “anticipate[] the disputants’—or a community’s—
reactions to [its] behaviour.”178 The legitimation of the legal system, like the
legitimation of any government institution, “is constituted by its collective
acceptance,”179 and this acceptance depends upon public perception.180 That
174. See infra note 200.
175. For a contemporary example of scholarly analysis of perlocutionary effects, see
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1633, 1658-59 (2004).
176. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (memorandum of
Scalia, J.) (“To expect judges to take account of political consequences—and to assess the high or
low degree of them—is to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do.”).
177. Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, in Martin
Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization 63 (2002).
178. Id.
179. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 117 (1995). “Institutions
survive on acceptance.” Id. at 118. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the
Effective Rule of Law, 30 Crime & Just. 283, 307 (2003) (“Legitimacy is the property that a rule
or an authority has when others feel obligated to defer voluntarily.”); Oscar Schachter, Towards a
Theory of International Obligation, 8 Va. J. Int’l L. 300, 309 (1968) (“[W]hether a designated
requirement is to be regarded as obligatory will depend in part on whether those who have made
that designation are regarded by those to whom the requirement is addressed (the target audience)
as endowed with the requisite competence or authority for that role.”).
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perception, in turn, is a result of the perlocutionary effect, rather than the
illocutionary force, of judicial opinions.181 This is all so clear that we might
pose the opposite inquiry: If the perlocutionary effects of an opinion are
consistent with, or required by, overarching goals of the legal system, why
should it matter whether the opinion is inconsistent with professional reason?
One possible answer is that the legitimacy of the legal system also
depends, as Mishkin observed in his Foreword, on the popular belief that courts
decide cases based upon law, which means based upon the logic of professional
reason. In his recent confirmation hearings Chief Justice John Roberts
masterfully appealed to this belief: “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t
make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody
ever went to a ball game to see an umpire.”182 It is in part because much of the
public believes that judges are merely umpires who apply preexisting principles
that judicial decisions have legitimacy with litigants who lose as well as with
litigants who win.183 On this view, courts legitimate the legal system when they
construct their opinions according to the dictates of professional reason.
This is of course the central premise of legal process jurisprudence. The
basic idea is that faithful compliance with professional norms is in the long run
the best hope for legitimating the legal system. This idea is hotly debated
within the political science literature.184 But even if we accept its basic thrust,
as Mishkin plainly did, there is nevertheless much to be said about it. We shall
confine ourselves to two observations. First, the assumption that compliance
with professional norms legitimates courts in the long run does not necessarily
imply that courts ought to ignore the perlocutionary force of particular
180. Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that the “power” of Justices of the Supreme Court
is immense, but it is power springing from opinion. [Justices] are all-powerful so long
as the people consent to obey the law; they can do nothing when they scorn it. Now,
of all powers, that of opinion is the hardest to use, for it is impossible to say exactly
where its limits come. Often it is as dangerous to lag behind as to outstrip it.
The federal judges therefore must not only be good citizens and men of education
and integrity, qualities necessary for all magistrates, but must also be statesmen; they
must know how to understand the spirit of the age, to confront those obstacles that
can be overcome, and to steer out of the current when the tide threatens to carry them
away, and with them the sovereignty of the Union and obedience to its laws.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 150-51 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
Trans., 1969).
181. See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics
77 (1960) (“Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief
that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”).
182. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of
Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.).
183. For a theoretical account of this point, see Sweet, supra note 177.
184. See, e.g., Terri J. Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court 161-88 (1999)
(arguing that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court depends upon the results of its opinions, not
upon its legal reasoning).
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decisions. Mishkin was drawn to the contemplation of strong dilemmas because
he recognized that desirable perlocutionary impact might in particular cases
outweigh the general effect of routine adherence to principles of professional
craft. He also believed, however, that if breaches of professional norms were to
become common enough, the public might come to lose its “trust”185 that courts
are indeed impartial legal decision makers.186 No single case would likely
undermine public confidence in norms of professional practice,187 but every
publicly apparent violation of such norms would increase the risk of public
disillusionment.188 And, as Mishkin had observed early in his career,
185. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204-08 (2002); Carla Hesse & Robert Post,
Introduction, in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia 20 (Carla
Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999).
186. “Law depends for its existence on a reciprocity of expectations between the governed
and the governors, expectations that survive only when there is adherence to the rule of law.”
Martin P. Golding, Transitional Regimes and the Rule of Law, 19 Ratio Juris 387, 390 (1996).
187. For musing on the distrust of legality that a single decision can cause, see Robert Post,
Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, in Bush v. Gore: The
Question of Legitimacy (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
188. Martin Shapiro theorized this dilemma with perfect clarity:
If the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must have the authority and
public acceptance which the principled, reasoned opinion brings.
....
. . . To put it bluntly, the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its
policy goals without violating those popular and professional expectations of
“neutrality” which are an important factor in our legal tradition and a principal
source of the Supreme Court’s prestige. It is in these terms, and not in terms of the
philosophic, jurisprudential, or historical correctness of the concept of neutral
principles, that the debate should now proceed.
Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587, 603, 605-06 (1963). Compare Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992):
The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of
the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and
specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly
told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to
a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s
power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows
itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s
law means and to declare what it demands.
The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the
Court’s decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on
which the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court’s opinions, and our
contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification
would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is furnished by apposite
legal principle, something more is required. Because not every conscientious claim
of principled justification will be accepted as such, the justification claimed must be
beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people
to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in
principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no
bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court’s
legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in
which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the
Nation.
Id. at 865-66.
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repudiating the constraints of professional standards in order to achieve
desirable perlocutionary effects would also contribute to a “self-fulfilling”
prophecy in which the constraints of professional norms would grow
inexorably weaker.189
Legal process jurisprudence arose in order to defend law from the charge
that it was merely a mystified form of politics. It was born out of an intense
concern for the vulnerability of professional norms of craft, which it conceived
as perpetually at risk from the temptation to deform law by demeaning it into a
species of political action.190 Mishkin had so deeply internalized this concern
that it left him literally speechless before what he perceived to be the tragic
choice of strong dilemmas. As he wrote at the conclusion of his analysis of
Nixon, he could approve the Court’s focus on the perlocutionary effects of its
decision “only with tentativeness and subject to reexamination with greater
perspective,” because he was “sufficiently conscious of the dangers of simply
concluding that short term success is its own proof of right.”191 At the end of
his Bakke lecture, he did not deem it appropriate to go even that far.
Strong dilemmas were unspeakable for Mishkin because they threatened
to undermine the professional norms that made possible the rule of law.
Mishkin was especially sensitive to the possibility of strong dilemmas because,
like many involved in legal process jurisprudence who sought to repel the
challenge of legal realism, he was concerned to stress the determinate integrity
of professional norms.192 He therefore imagined that violations of “good
lawyership”193 potentially caused by strong dilemmas would be immediately
obvious and demoralizing. Underlying Mishkin’s apprehension of the tragedy
of strong dilemmas, in other words, lay a particular picture of the autonomy
and thus the vulnerability of professional principles.
The force of strong dilemmas might well change, however, if professional
norms were defined differently. Our second observation goes to this point: The
more that professional norms are conceptualized in ways that are impervious to
the achievement of perlocutionary goals and that seem to require determinate
outcomes, the more likely strong dilemmas are to arise. Conversely, the more
that professional norms are conceptualized as supple and indeterminate, the
more likely it is that the various perlocutionary ends that courts might
otherwise seek to achieve can be rendered consistent with professional reason,
and the less likely it is that strong dilemmas will arise.
Professional reason ought to be framed so as to achieve the purposes of
the legal system. No doubt these purposes include the fair, just, and efficient

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See generally Mishkin, supra note 27.
See supra note 11.
Mishkin, supra note 32, at 91.
See supra note 26.
Hart, supra note 3, at 100.
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resolution of disputes.194 But if, as we have argued in Part V, these purposes
also include the expression of fundamental social values, norms of professional
reason should also be defined so as to facilitate the capacity of the legal order
“to bring the public administration of justice into touch with changed moral,
social, or political conditions.”195 This dimension of professional craft is what
Brandeis196 and Frankfurter 197 called judicial “statesmanship.” 198 Infusing craft
norms with considerations of statesmanship would not only enhance the law’s
ability to achieve the important function of expressing social ideals, it would
also reduce the likelihood that achieving desirable perlocutionary effects would
conflict with principles of professional reason. This suggests that by stressing
the distinction between the professional logic of legal reason and the emotional
logic of cultural symbolism, Mishkin was actually conceptualizing professional
norms in ways that would enhance the likelihood of strong dilemmas. How
professional norms ought to be constructed ultimately turns on the appropriate
jurisprudential balance between fidelity to social values and faithfulness to the
autonomous requirements of professional reason.
Contemporary scholars, taking their lead from Bickel,199 have not tended
to focus on the issue of strong dilemmas. This is not because such dilemmas do
not exist, but instead because contemporary scholars have conceived
194. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1362 (1997).
195. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 14 Am. Law. 445, 445 (1906).
196. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 299,
314.
197. Felix Frankfurter, The Court and Statesmanship, in Law and Politics 34 (Archibald
MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939). See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the
Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 679, 702 (1999) (For Frankfurter the Court was “a forum for ‘statesmanship’ . . . . In that
new role, the Court had to recognize the nondeterminative nature of the Constitution’s vague
provisions, the wisdom and propriety of deferring to legislative judgments, and the unavoidable
need ‘to gather meaning not from reading the Constitution but from reading life.’” (citation
omitted)).
198. For de Tocqueville’s views on judicial statesmanship, see supra note 180. Chief
Justice Taft agreed on this point. In a letter congratulating George Sutherland on his appointment
to the Supreme Court, Taft wrote:
I do not minimize at all the importance of having Judges of learning in the law on the
Supreme Bench, but the functions performed by us are of such a peculiar character
that something in addition is much needed to round out a man for service upon that
Bench, and that is a sense of proportion derived from a knowledge of how
Government is carried on, and how higher politics are conducted in the State. A
Supreme Judge must needs keep abreast of the actual situation in the country so as to
understand all the phases of important issues which arise, with a view to the proper
application of the Constitution, which is a political instrument in a way, to new
conditions.
Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland (Sept. 10, 1922), microformed on William
H. Taft Papers, Reel 245 (Library of Cong., 1969).
199. See, e.g., Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, supra note 76,
at 91 (“Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations
between the Court and the people and their representatives.”).
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professional reason as effectively in dialogue with public values.200 This
dialogue renders strong dilemmas less likely to arise. Mishkin’s work reminds
us, however, that this approach risks potential danger. If professional norms are
rendered too permeable to social values, the autonomous integrity of legal
reason may be diluted and compromised, so that the practice of professional
reason may in the public mind begin to merge with the exercise of merely
political power. A veteran of the battles over legal realism, Mishkin might well
regard contemporary scholarship as foolishly complacent about this potential
vulnerability of professional reason. Yet it would be ironic indeed if Mishkin’s
efforts to shore up professional craft by emphasizing its autonomy were to have
the ultimate effect of rendering legal reasoning more fragile, because more
susceptible to the recurring corrosion of strong dilemmas.
VII
Mishkin as a Colleague and Teacher: An Appreciation
Mishkin’s reserve about strong dilemmas has fortunately not extended to
his activities as a colleague and a teacher. In those capacities, he has been an
unending source of wisdom and insight.201 As a teacher, Mishkin has pursued
the antinomy of professional reason and popular belief. Regardless of which
side of the divide his students might select, Mishkin has never allowed them to
rest easy with their choice. He applied this method to a range of subjects, from
Chief Justice Marshall’s performance in Marbury v. Madison,202 to the passivevirtues debate,203 to the Court’s controversial disposition of Naim v. Naim.204
200. See, e.g., Post, supra note 118, at 107-12; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993). For a recent overview and assessment of such work, see
Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
201. See, e.g., Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 67, 67 n.1A (1960) (“It would be dishonest or very naïve not to recognize the heavy debt
the author owes to Professor Paul Mishkin. He cannot be charged with any of the ideas this Note
contains, nor can his reaction to them be anticipated. But the impression remains that so much of it
as is intellectually satisfying derives from perspectives—or from methods of developing
perspectives—which are held on loan from him.”).
202. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
203. Compare Bickel, supra note 30, at 111-98, with Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin,
David L. Shapiro, & Herbert Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 660-62 (2d ed. 1973), and Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
“Passive Virtues” A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 11-12 (1964). See supra note 77.
204. See 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissing for want of a substantial federal question a
challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute despite the statute’s incompatibility with the
equal protection principles first articulated in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). See,
e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 2017 (“Naim [did not] exemplify how the Court should go about its
daily business. Rather, it constituted a rare accommodation that principle made with pragmatism
for the ultimate purpose of vindicating Brown’s promise. Principle lost the battle for a few more
years, a significant—and perhaps intolerable—cost, but at least principle put itself in a position
not to lose the war.” (footnotes omitted)). When the legitimacy of Brown was more secure, the
Court unanimously invalidated Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute as a violation of equal
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Mishkin characteristically impressed on his students and colleagues the
potentially acute tradeoff between legal principle and wise politics; the
normative power of the actual;205 the subtle yet profound importance of
symbols and appearances, from columns to robes;206 and the critical distinction
between dishonesty and less than full candor.207 The tough antinomies that
Mishkin identified in his writing unleashed magical discussions for all of us
lucky enough to know him well, discussions we will never forget. His students
and his colleagues cannot help but read high-profile, recent decisions—like
those involving homosexuality208 and symbolic endorsements of religion209—in
light of the perennial tension between the general obligation to conform to
protection and due process. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
205. During the litigation over Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mishkin
coauthored an amicus brief on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union in which he argued
that the rule requiring certain procedural protections should be deemed prophylactically necessary.
See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 1966
WL 100516, at *21 (“The Inherently Compelling Nature of Police Custodial Interrogation
Requires That a Confession Obtained During Such Interrogation Be Excluded Unless the State
Shows That There Were Present Adequate Devices to Protect the Subject’s Privilege Against SelfIncrimination.”). He did not believe that the Court was prepared to hold that the Constitution
required such warnings. Mishkin proved correct, and the Court adopted his unusual rationale.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (“[W]e hold that when an individual is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege.”); see also id. at 463 (noting “both the dangers of interrogation
and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of interrogation itself”). Yet
thirty-four years after Miranda changes on the ground in actual police practices prepared the
Court to decide in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), that “Miranda is
constitutionally based.” Id. at 440. The change could be interpreted as illustrating what Mishkin
would call the normative power of the actual.
206. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 46, at 63 n.29 (“Though I know that judges are human
and quite distinct individuals, I am not in favor of their doffing their robes, for I think there is
value in stressing, for themselves and for others, the quite real striving for an impersonality I
know can never be fully achieved.”).
207. The difference between using the Constitution as a shield and using it as a sword also
comes to mind. So does the distinction between finality and infallibility.
208. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court dramatically overruled Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), announcing a right of sexual privacy in the home that extends
to homosexuals. Yet the Court appeared ambivalent about whether the right sounded in liberty or
equality, see 539 U.S. at 575, avoided the language of fundamental rights or strict scrutiny, id. at
578, and suggested that the issue of gay marriage was distinguishable without explaining why or
how, id. If the Court followed to its logical conclusion its defense of the dignity of intimate
homosexual relationships and the state’s lack of authority to demean homosexuals, id. at 560, 567,
575, and 578, prohibitions of gay marriage would almost certainly violate equal protection. Yet
the Court explicitly avoided this conclusion. Id. at 578.
209. In McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), the Court held 5-4 that the McCreary County Ten Commandments
display violated the Establishment Clause but that the Van Orden monument did not. Only Justice
Breyer was in the majority in both cases, and his narrow concurrence in the judgment was decisive
in Van Orden. Breyer declared that he was acting explicitly to reduce the “divisiveness” that Ten
Commandments cases generate. 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). He sent a
strong signal that advocates of church-state separation should not challenge longstanding displays
and that their adversaries should not build new ones. Id. at 703-04.
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professional standards and the perlocutionary effects of a singular opinion.
As a teacher and as a colleague, Mishkin has always been the master of
legal craft. He has implacably pursued the goal of legal excellence. A
consummate professional, he has given generously of his insight and
experience. To his students, Mishkin has continuously emphasized the kind of
mid-level theorizing characteristic of first-rate lawyers. He has proven a hard
taskmaster, with no affection for lazy or sentimental thinking. But over the
years he has been as demanding of himself as he has been of others, and he has
inspired fierce loyalty and affection.
Mishkin is particularly fond of the declaration of a Talmudic rabbi who
said: “And especially from my students did I learn!” The rabbi’s profession of
gratitude struck Mishkin some time ago, and it has resonated with him ever
since. We, too, have a debt to declare. We count ourselves very fortunate to
have learned from Paul Mishkin in his role as a colleague, teacher, and dear
friend. His insight and his rigor have guided us, and his scholarly humility has
reminded us that at most we can aspire to form part of an ongoing conversation
about the nature of our indispensable and yet ultimately mysterious
Constitution. If we are lucky, we can at times have interlocutors as deep, as
challenging, and as far-seeing as Mishkin.
And especially from Paul have we learned.

